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ISSN 1657-7191 The diﬀerence indiﬀerence makes in strategy-proof
allocation of objects∗
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Abstract
We study the problem of allocating objects among people. We consider
cases where each object is initially owned by someone, no object is initially
owned by anyone, and combinations of the two. The problems we look at
are those where each person has a need for exactly one object and initially
owns at most one object (also known as “house allocation with existing
tenants”). We split with most of the existing literature on this topic by
dropping the assumption that people can always strictly rank the objects.
We show that, without this assumption, problems in which either some or all
of the objects are not initially owned are equivalent to problems where each
object is initially owned by someone. Thus, it suﬃces to study problems of
the latter type.
We ask if there are eﬃcient rules that provide incentives for each person
not only to participate (rather than stay home with what he owns), but also
to state his preferences honestly. Our main contribution is to show that the
answer is positive. The intuitive “top trading cycles” algorithm provides
the only such rule for environments where people are never indiﬀerent (Ma
1994). We generalize this algorithm in a way that allows for indiﬀerence
without compromising on eﬃciency and incentives.
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sobre Desarrollo Económico  La diferencia que hacen las indiferencias en la
asignaci´ on sin manipulaci´ on de objetos
Paula Jaramillo* y Vikram Manjunath**
Resumen
Estudiamos problemas de asignaci´ on de objetos entre personas. Conside-
ramos casos en los que cada persona es due˜ na de un objeto, nadie es due˜ no
de un objeto y combinaciones de los dos. Los problemas que estudiamos
son aquellos en que cada persona necesita un ´ unico objeto e inicialmente es
due˜ no de un objeto (tambi´ en conocido como “house allocation with existing
tenants”). Nosotros nos diferenciamos de la mayor´ ıa de la literatura, al re-
lajar el supuesto que cada persona puede ordenar estrictamente los objetos
seg´ un sus preferencias. Nosotros mostramos que, al considerar indiferencias
en las preferencias, problemas en el que alg´ un o ning´ un objeto pertenece a
alguien son equivalentes a problemas en los que cada persona es due˜ na de
un objeto. Entonces, es suﬁciente trabajar con problemas del ´ ultimo tipo.
Nuestra mayor contribuci´ on es mostrar que hay reglas eﬁcientes que
provean incentivos a cada persona no solo para participar (en vez de quedarse
en su casa con el objeto del que es due˜ no), si no para reportar sus preferen-
cias honestamente. El intuitivo algoritmo de “ciclos comercio en la cima”
provee la ´ unica regla cuando las personas nunca son indiferentes (Ma, 1994).
Nosotros generalizamos este algoritmo de forma que se permiten indiferen-
cias sin comprometer eﬁciencia e incentivos.
Clasiﬁcaci´ on JEL : C71, C78, D71, D78
Palabras claves: no manipulaic´ on, bienes indivisibles, indiferencias, mercado de casas, asignaci´ on
de casas, intercambio de ri˜ nones
*Universidad de Los Andes
**University of Rochester y Universit´ e de Montr´ eal
11 Introduction
Consider a setting where each person in a group has a need for a single object
(such as a seminar slot, an on-campus apartment, or an organ for transplant) and
may or may not be endowed with such an object. Further, suppose that there are
no divisible goods, such as money. Even when every person is endowed with an
object, the initial distribution is not necessarily eﬃcient.
When people are never indiﬀerent between objects, there are strategy-proof,
Pareto-eﬃcient, and individually rational rules (Abdulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez 1999).
In fact, a group of such rules is characterized by these three axioms with the help
of consistency and neutrality axioms (S¨ onmez and ¨ Unver 2010). Moreover, the
class of rules satisfying group strategy-proofness and Pareto-eﬃciency has been
characterized (Pycia and ¨ Unver 2009).
At one extreme of this class of problems are those where nobody is endowed
with an object and there is only a social endowment (Hylland and Zeckhauser
1979). At the other extreme are problems where everybody is endowed with an
object but there is no social endowment (Shapley and Scarf 1974). For these
problems, when people are never indiﬀerent between objects, there are rules with
desirable eﬃciency and incentive properties. The core contains a unique allo-
cation which is also the unique competitive allocation (Roth and Postlewaite
1977). The rule that maps each problem with its unique core allocation is not
only strategy-proof (Roth 1982) but also group strategy-proof (Bird 1984). Fur-
ther, it is the only strategy-proof, Pareto-eﬃcient, and individually rational rule
(Ma 1994, S¨ onmez 1999). It is also non-bossy and anonymous (Miyagawa 2002).
We argue that there are many real-world situations where people’s preferences
do exhibit indiﬀerence. For instance, if preferences are based on coarse descriptions
(say, from a housing brochure), there may be insuﬃcient information to break ties.
Alternatively, if preferences are based on checklists of criteria (like blood and tissue
types for organ transplant), distinct objects satisfying exactly the same criteria are
equivalent.
Appropriate design of rules should take these indiﬀerences into account since
breaking ties arbitrarily may lead to ineﬃciency.
We show that when we drop the assumption that people are never indiﬀerent,
all of the problems mentioned above can be thought of as ones where every person
is endowed with an object. Thus, we study only such problems. Without strict
2preferences, many of the results mentioned above no longer hold. Though the
weak core is not empty, the a core allocation is no longer guaranteed to exist
(Shapley and Scarf 1974).1 The set of competitive allocations no longer coincides
with the core (Wako 1991). Group strategy-proofness and Pareto-eﬃciency are
incompatible (Ehlers 2002).
We show that there may not even be a competitive allocation that is Pareto-
eﬃcient. We provide a direct proof that strategy-proofness, Pareto-eﬃciency, and
individual rationality are not compatible with non-bossiness.2 Further, we show
that, even when we drop individual rationality, they are not compatible with
anonymity.
Our main contribution is a novel algorithm that is associated with a strategy-
proof, Pareto-eﬃcient, and individual rational rule. Moreover, the allocation se-
lected is in the “weak core”.
Recently, the assumption of strict preferences has received attention for various
matching models. Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011) have independently come up
with a diﬀerent class of rules for the model studied in this paper. For the “two-sided
matching” model, the deferred acceptance algorithm can be adapted to preserve
“stability” and Pareto eﬃciency in the presence of indiﬀerence (Erdil and Ergin
2006). However, this adaptation does not preserve “one-sided” strategy-proofness,
which means that an application of this algorithm to our model does not satisfy
strategy-proofness.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in
Section 2. We describe some desiderata of allocations and rules in Section 3 and
deﬁne our rules, along with some others, in Section 4. In Section 5 we present our
results. We show how the more general problems involving social endowments can
be encoded as problems with only private endowments in Section 6.
2 The Model
Let O be a set of distinct objects. Let N be a set of people. There are exactly as
many objects as people: |O| = |N|.A nendowment is a bijection, ω : N → O,
that associates an object with each person. For each i ∈ N, i’s component of the
endowment is ω(i). Each person has a preference relation over O.L e tt h es e to f
all preference relations be R.A preference proﬁle associates each individual
with a preference relation in R.L e tRN be the set of all preference proﬁles. Given
1Quint and Wako (2004) provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions on preference proﬁles for
the core to be non-empty.
2Bogomolnaia, Deb and Ehlers (2005) show this by characterizing, for problems with no
private endowment, classes of strategy-proof and Pareto-eﬃcient rules satisfying two diﬀerent
forms of non-bossiness and some auxillary axioms.
3a proﬁle R ∈R N,f o re a c hi ∈ N, i’s preference relation is Ri. For each pair of
alternatives, a,b ∈ O,i fi ﬁnds a to be at least as good as b, we write aR i b.I f
a is better than b,t h a ti s ,aR i b but not bR i a, we write aP i b. Similarly, if i
is indiﬀerent between a and b, we write aI i b.L e tP⊂Rbe the set of “strict”
preference relations. That is, P≡{ R0 ∈R:f o r e a c h a,b ∈ O,a I0 b ⇔ a = b}.
We use the notation R−i to denote the preference relations of everyone but i.
For each group S ⊆ N, we denote the preferences of all the people in S by RS,
and those not in S by R−S. We denote the set of all preferences for people in the
group S by RS.
Let A, the set of all bijections from N to O, be the set of all possible allocations.
For each α ∈ A,a n de a c hi ∈ N,l e tα(i) denote i’s component of α. Similarly,




A problem consists of a preference proﬁle and an endowment, (R,ω) ∈R N×A.
A rule, ϕ : RN × A → A, selects an allocation for each problem.
3 Properties of allocations and rules
In this section, we list some desiderata of allocations and rules. Let ϕ be a rule.
The ﬁrst requirement is that a rule respects each individual’s endowment. That
is, the allocation selected by the rule should not assign, to any person, an object
that he ﬁnds worse than his endowment.
For each (R,ω) ∈R N × A and α ∈ A,w es a yt h a tα is individually ra-
tional at (R,ω) if for each i ∈ N,α(i) Ri ω(i). Let IR(R,ω) be the set of all
individually rational allocations at (R,ω).
Individual Rationality: For each (R,ω) ∈R N × A, ϕ(R,ω) ∈ IR(R,ω).
Before we state the next requirement, we deﬁne an eﬃciency relation between
allocations. For each α,β ∈ A and R ∈R N, α Pareto dominates β at R if at
least one person is better oﬀ at α than at β and nobody is worse oﬀ. That is, for
some i ∈ N, α(i) Pi β(i)a n df o re a c hi ∈ N,α(i) Ri β(i).
For each R ∈R N, let the set of allocations that are not Pareto dominated by
any other allocation be PE(R).
Pareto-eﬃciency: For each (R,ω) ∈R N × A, ϕ(R,ω) ∈ PE(R).
The next property says that unilaterally misreporting one’s preferences is never
beneﬁcial.
4Strategy-proofness: For each (R,ω) ∈R N × A, there is no i ∈ N for whom
there is R 
i ∈R such that
ϕ( R
 
i     
lie
,R −i,ω)(i) Pi     
truth
ϕ( Ri     
truth
,R −i,ω)(i).
The following is the requirement that nobody can aﬀect what the rule assigns
to others without aﬀecting his own assignment.





i,R −i,ω)(i)a n dϕ(R,ω)  = ϕ(R
 
i,R −i,ω).
The next desideratum is that the rule is a function of preferences and en-
dowments, but not identities. Let π : N → N be a permutation of N.F o r
each (R,ω) ∈R N × A, deﬁne the permutation of (R,ω) with respect to π,
(Rπ,ω π) ∈R N × A, such that for each i ∈ N, Rπ
π(i) ≡ Ri and ωπ
π(i) ≡ ωi.





The ﬁnal requirement is that no group of people would rather re-allocate their
endowments among themselves than participate in the application of the rule. This
c a nb ee x p r e s s e di nt w ow a y s .F i r s t ,f o re a c hα ∈ A,( R,ω) ∈R N ×A,a n dS ⊆ N,
we say that α is blocked by S if members of S can re-allocate their endowments
in a way that makes each of them better oﬀ than at α. That is, there is β ∈ A
such that β(S)=ω(S)a n df o re a c hi ∈ S,β(i) Pi α(i). Second, we say that α
is weakly blocked by S if members of S can re-allocate their endowments in a
way that makes at least one of them better oﬀ than at α, without making any of
the rest worse oﬀ than at α. That is, there is β ∈ A such that β(S)=ω(S), for
some i ∈ S,β(i) Pi α(i), and for each i ∈ S,β(i) Ri α(i).
The weak core, CW(R,ω), is the set of allocations that are not blocked by
any coalition and the core, C(R,ω), is the set of allocations that are not weakly
blocked by any coalition.
4 Rules
Let ≺ be a linear ordering of N.
Sequential priority rules: Let a tie-breaker θ : P(A) \{ ∅}→A be such that
for each A  ⊆ A, θ(A ) ∈ A .3 The sequential priority rule with respect to
≺ and θ, SP≺,θ, is deﬁned as follows. Suppose ≺ is such that 1 ≺ 2 ≺···≺n.
3Given a set S,w ed e n o t et h epower set of S by P(S).






0 = A.F o re a c hi =1 ,...n,
A
R,ω
i = {α ∈ A
R,ω





Sequential priority rules are strategy-proof and Pareto-eﬃcient (Svensson 1994).
But they are not individually rational.
Sequential priority selections from IR: Let θ be a tie-breaker.T h esequen-
tial priority selection from IR with respect to ≺ and θ, SP-IR≺,θ, is
deﬁned exactly as SP≺,θ except that A
R,ω
0 = IR(R,ω).
Sequential priority selections from IR are not strategy-proof but are Pareto-
eﬃcient and, by deﬁnition, individually rational.5
The notion of “most preferred” objects among a subset of O is critical for the
deﬁnition of our next rule. For each R ∈R N, O  ⊆ O,a n di ∈ N,l e ti’s most
preferred objects, under Ri, among O , be denoted by τ(Ri,O  ) ≡{ a ∈ A :
for each b ∈ O ,aR i b}.
Gale’s “top trading cycles” algorithm (Shapley and Scarf 1974) is applicable
after breaking ties arbitrarily. The algorithm, deﬁned for preferences in PN,p r o -
ceeds by asking each person to point at the person endowed his most preferred
object. Since each person points, there is at least one cycle and the members
of such cycles exchange their objects accordingly. Once the objects have been
exchanged, these people are removed and the algorithm continues among those
remaining.
The associated rules are strategy-proof and individually rational but not Pareto-
eﬃcient. To see this, consider the following example in which, no matter how ties
are broken, the result of the “top trading cycles” algorithm is not Pareto-eﬃcient.
Example 1. Breaking ties.





4This deﬁnition is taken from Svensson (1994).
5It is easy to show that the sequential priority selections from IR are Pareto-eﬃcient and
individually rational. To see that they are not strategy-proof consider the following example.
Let N = {1,2,3}, ω = {a,b,c}, and the following preferences: P1 : cab , P2 : abc ,a n dP3 : abc .
Suppose that 1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3. Then, for each θ, SP-IR≺,θ(R,ω)=( c,a,b). If 3 reports P 
3 : acb
instead, for each θ, SP-IR≺,θ(R−3,R  
3,ω)=( c,b,a) and 3 is better oﬀ.















But for (P 1,ω) the reccommendation is (b,a,c)a n df o r( P 2,ω)i ti s( c,b,a). Neither
of these is Pareto-eﬃcient.6
The next class of rules that we deﬁne are based on an adaptation of this al-
gorithm.7 Two questions need to be answered to adapt the top-trading cycles
algorithm:
1. When can a person be removed? In Example 1, if 2 gets a, 1 cannot leave
with b since that would violate Pareto-eﬃciency. Clearly, it is not enough for
a person to leave when he “holds” one of his most preferred objects. With
the description of our algorithm, we state a more sophisticated condition
that needs to be met for a person (or group of people) to be removed. This
aspect of our algorithm is crucial to achieving a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation.
2. When a person is indiﬀerent between objects, where does he point? This is
a more diﬃcult question. We explain how to deal with this issue in a way
that does not compromise strategy-proofness. In addition, our condition
guarantees that the algorithm terminates.
Corresponding to the two questions that we have just raised, we change the
algorithm at each step in two signiﬁcant ways:
i) Condition for departure: A group of people can leave only if there is no trade
with people outside of the group that can make someone outside the group
better oﬀ without hurting someone inside the group. This condition ensures
Pareto-eﬃciency of the ﬁnal allocation. In Example 1, if 2 gets a,h ec a n
leave with it since any further trade would make him worse oﬀ. However, 1
cannot leave with b: there is a trade, between 1 and 3 that would make 3
better oﬀ without hurting 1. Thus, 1 and 3 trade and 1 leaves with c and 3
with b.
6The reason for this is that regardless of how we break ties, the result of the top-trading cycles
algorithm is a “competitive allocation” (Shapley and Scarf 1974). In fact every competitive
allocation can be found in this way. However, as evidenced by the above example, for some
proﬁles of preferences, no competitive allocation is Pareto-eﬃcient.
7However, we have the “departure phase” at the beginning of each step rather than at the end.
We have done this for expositional simplicity since it rules out people “pointing” at themselves.
7ii) Condition for pointing: A natural way to solve the problem is to use a
priority order over the people. However, na¨ ıvely breaking ties according to a
ﬁxed priority order does not work. We illustrate this through the following
examples.




Let 1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3. Suppose each person cannot point at himself when he
is indiﬀerent between what he holds and what someone else holds.8 In
this case, 1 and 2 trade at each step between them and the condition
of departure is never satisﬁed. The algorithm does not terminate.
To guarantee that the algorithm terminates, the priority order deﬁned
in the algorithm is updated at every stage to give higher priority to
people who do not hold one of their most preferred objects than to
people who hold one of their most preferred objects.
(b) Let N = {1,2,3,4,5}, ω =( a,b,c,d,e)a n dR ∈R N be as follows.
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
cd ade b b a
aba d e
c
Let 2 ≺ 3 ≺ 4 ≺ 5 ≺ 1. If we use a na¨ ıve pointing scheme, in the ﬁrst
step, 1 points at 3 and 2 at 4. Then, 2 and 4 trade and 4 leaves with
b. In the second step, since 2 ≺ 3a n d5≺ 1, 1 points at 2 and 2 points
at 5. Then, 1, 2, and 5 trade. The algorithm terminates and the ﬁnal





, 3’s assignment is a.
Therefore, 3 is better oﬀ reporting the lie R 
3 when his true preference
relation is R3 and others’ preferences are R−3.
To guarantee that the rule is strategy-proof,a te a c hs t e p ,e a c hi points
at the same person that he pointed at in the previous step as long as
that person holds the same object (that is, he did not trade).
8Otherwise, 1 will point to himself at each step of the algorithm. Since the departure condition
is not met, the algorithm does not terminate.
8We bring these ideas together and deﬁne a modiﬁcation of the top-trading cycles
algorithm.
Top cycles rules: For each (R,ω) ∈R N × A, we deﬁne the allocation selected
by top cycles rule with priority ≺,T C ≺(R,ω), via the following algorithm.
Each step of the algorithm proceeds in three phases: departure, pointing, and
trading. The goal of the algorithm is to enlarge, at each step, the set of “satisﬁed”
people: those holding one of their most preferred objects. However, we aim to do
this in a way that provides incentives for every person to report his true preferences.
To achieve this, the algorithm favors people who have higher priority by connecting
more people to them (via direct or indirect pointing) as compared to people with
lower priority.
In the ﬁrst step, the set of remaining people is N and each i ∈ N holds ω(i).
1. Departure: A group of people is chosen to “depart” if two conditions are
met.
i) What each person in the group holds is among his most preferred objects
(among the remaining ones), and
ii) All of the most preferred objects (among the remaining ones) of the
group are held by them.
Once a group departs, each of them is assigned what he holds and removed
from the set of remaining people. In addition, their objects are removed
from the remaining objects. There may be another group that can be chosen
to depart. The process continues until there are no more groups that can
depart. If the two conditions are not met by any group, then nobody departs.
2. Pointing: Each person points at a person holding one of his top objects
(among the remaining ones). Since there may be more than one such person,
the problem of ﬁguring whom each person points at is a complicated one.
W es o l v ei ti ns t a g e sa sf o l l o w s :
Stage 1) For each remaining j such that j holds the same object that he held in
the previous step, each i that pointed at j in the previous step points
at j in the current step. Of course, this does not apply for the very ﬁrst
step.
Stage 2) Each i with a unique top object (among the remaining ones) points at
the person holding it.
Stage 3) Each person who has at least one of his top objects (among the re-
maining ones) held by an unsatisﬁed person points at whomever has
the highest priority among such unsatisﬁed people.
9Stage 4) Each person who has at least one of his top objects (among the remain-
ing ones) held by a satisﬁed person who points at an unsatisﬁed person
points at whomever points at the unsatisﬁed person with highest prior-
ity. If two or more of his satisﬁed “candidates” point at the unsatisﬁed
person with highest priority, he points at the satisﬁed candidate with
the highest priority.
Stage ···)A n ds oo n .
3. Trading: Since each remaining person points at someone, there is at least
one cycle of remaining people. For each such cycle, people trade according
to the way that they point and what they hold for the next step is updated
accordingly.
The algorithm terminates when everyone has departed.
To see that the algorithm terminates, note that at each step, since N is ﬁnite
and there is at least one cycle involving an unsatisﬁed person, either
1. At least one person departs with his holding, or
2. At least one person’s holding is switched to an object that he ranks highest
among those remaining. That is at least one person becomes satisﬁed.
Therefore, the algorithm terminates in a ﬁnite number of steps.9 Since the algo-
rithm terminates and provides a unique allocation for every problem, TC≺ is a
well-deﬁned rule.
A rigorous formal description of the algorithm is in Appendix A.
To help illustrate the top cycles rule, we provide Example 2. First, we state
some useful deﬁnitions. In the tth step, after the departure phase, there is a set
of remaining objects, Ot ⊆ O,a n dremaining people, Nt ⊆ N.E a c h
remaining person, i ∈ Nt, holds the object ht(i).10 For each i ∈ Nt,t h eperson
whom i points at, pt(i). For notational convenience, for each i,j ∈ Nt,w eu s e
i −→
t j to denote pt(i)=j.I f pt(pt(i)) = j, we write i −→
t −→
t j,a n ds oo n .
Given M ⊆ Nt,i fpt(i) ∈ M, we write i −→
t M.I f pt(pt(i)) ∈ M, we write
i −→
t −→
t M,a n ds oo n .
At each step, the set of remaining people is partitioned into two sets: satisﬁed
people, St ≡{ i ∈ Nt : ht(i) ∈ τ(Ri,O t)}, who hold an object that they rank
9The algorithm is polynomial time: O(|N|5)w h e r e|N| is the number of people in the problem.
10Note that for each i, ht(i) denotes the object that i holds at the beginning of Step t,w h i l e
ht+1(i) denotes the object i is holding at the end of Step t.I fi trades in Step t, the object that
he holds in Step t, ht(i), is diﬀerent from the one he has at the end of Step t and beginning of
Step t +1 ,ht+1(i). If i does not trade ht(i)=ht+1(i).
10at the top of the remaining objects, and the unsatisﬁed people who do not,
Ut ≡ Nt \ St.
Example 2. Top cycles rule.
Let O = {a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k},a n dN = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11}.C o n -
sider (R,ω) ∈R N × A such that ω =( a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k)a n dR ∈R N as
follows:
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11
a a f cdef deg de d dhi ci abj eik











Let ≺ be such that 1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3 ≺ 4 ≺ 8 ≺ 5 ≺ 6 ≺ 7 ≺ 9 ≺ 10 ≺ 11.
We start with O0 = O,N0 = N,a n dh1 = ω.
Step 1:
Departure phase:
The ﬁrst group to depart is {1}. To see this, note that 1’s most preferred
object in O is the unique object a, his endowment. Given that 1 leaves
with a, the second group to departs is {2,10}, 2’s most preferred object in
O \{a} is the unique object b and 10’s most preferred objects in O \{a} are
b and j.N o w ,TC≺(R,ω)(1) = a, TC≺(R,ω)(2) = b,a n dTC≺(R,ω)(10) =
j. Further, the remaining people are N1 = {3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11},a n dt h e
remaining objects are O1 = ω(N1). From this, the satisﬁed people are S1 =
{4,5,8,9,11}.
Pointing phase: This is illustrated in Figure 2.
Stage 1) Not applicable to the ﬁrst step.
Stage 2) Each person with a unique most preferred object in O1 points at whomever





Stage 3) Each person such that one of their most preferred objects is held by an
unsatisﬁed person points at an unsatisﬁed person. Such people are 4,
5, and 9. Since 5 and 9 have only one unsatisﬁed person to point at,




3. However, 4 is
indiﬀerent between the objects held by 3 and 6. In accordance with ≺,
4 −→
1 3.
Stage 4) Each person whose most preferred objects are held by satisﬁed people
pointing at an unsatisﬁed person. 6, 8, and 11 are such people. Since 4
and 5 hold 6’s most preferred objects, we consider who they are pointing
11at. Since 4 −→
1 3,5 −→
1 7, and 3 ≺ 7, we have 6 −→
1 4 rather than
6 −→
1 5. 8’s preferred objects (among the remaining ones) are hold by
9 and 4. Note that both point at 3. Since 4 ≺ 9, 8 −→
1
4. Since 5 and 9












The only group satisfying the departure condition is {3}. From this, TC≺(R,ω)(3) =
f, N2 = {4,5,6,7,9,11}, O2 = {c,d,e,g,h,i,k},a n dS2 = {4,5,6,8,9,11}.
Pointing phase: This is illustrated in Figure 2.
Stage 1) Note that 5 was pointing at 7 in Step 1 and 7 is holding the same object.
That is, 5 −→
1 7 ∈ N2 and h2(7) = h1(7). Then, we have 5 −→
2 7. In
addition, since 11 −→
1 9 ∈ N2 and h2(9) = h1(9), we have 11 −→
2 9.11
Stage 2) Since 7’s unique most preferred object is d,7−→
2 6.
Stage 3) No person, other than 5, most prefers g (7’s holding) among O2.
Stage 4) 4 and 6 point at 5 whose pointing to an unsatisﬁed person: 4 −→









At the end of this Step, there is one cycle and it involves 5, 6, and 7. In the
trading phase,w eg e th3 =( −,−,−,c,g,e,d,h,i,−,k).
Step 3:
Departure phase:
We end after the departure phase of Step 3 since all the remaining people,
{4,5,6,7,8,9,11}, satisfy the conditions. Then, N3 = ∅ y O3 = ∅.
Thus, TC≺(R,ω)=( a,b,f,c,g,e,d,h,i,j,k).




































Figure 1: Pointing phase of Step 1: (a) Since 3 and 7 have unique most
preferred objects, they point at whoever holds those objects. (b) Next, we consider
4, 9 and 5: those who have a most preferred object that is held by an unsatisﬁed
person in the bubble. (c) Finally, we consider 6, 8, and 11: those who have a most
preferred object that is held by a member of the bigger bubble: people who can
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Figure 2: Pointing phase of Step 2: (a) Since 5 pointed at 7 in Step 1 and 7
has not traded, 5 points at 7 in Step 2 as well. Similarly, 11 points at 9 in Step 2
as well. Without Stage 1, 11 would point to 5 in Step 2. (b) 7 is the only person
with a unique most preferred object. (c) We now consider people who can point
at the only unsatisﬁed person, 7. However, there is no such person. (d) Next, we
consider 4 and 6 who point into the bubble containing 7 and 5. (e) Finally, 8 and
9 point into the biggest bubble.
14In the next section, we show that TC≺ is strategy-proof, Pareto-eﬃcient,a n d
individually rational. We also show that TC≺ always picks an allocation from the
weak core.
When the input preference proﬁle does not involve any indiﬀerence, the priority
order ≺ plays no role in the deﬁnition of TC≺ since for each i ∈ N and each t,
τ(Ri,O t) is a singleton and pt(i) is deﬁned in the ﬁrst two stages of the pointing
phase.T h u s ,f o re a c h( P,ω) ∈P N × A and each pair of priority orders ≺ and ≺ ,
TC≺(P,ω)=TC≺ (P,ω).
Remark 1. It is natural to ask whether, for each (R,ω) ∈R N × A, there is a
corresponding problem (P  ,ω) ∈P N × A such that,
1. For each i ∈ N and each pair x,y ∈ O,i fxP  
i y,t h e nxR i y,a n d
2. TC≺(R,ω)=TC≺(P  ,ω).
However, this is not the case. Let us go back to Example 1. For each ≺ such
that 2 ≺ 3, TC≺(R,ω)=( c,a,b), and for each ≺  such that 3 ≺  2, TC≺ (R,ω)=
(b,c,a). But TC≺(P 1,ω)=( b,a,c)a n dTC≺(P 2,ω)=( c,b,a), neither of which
coincides with TC≺(R,ω)o rTC≺ (R,ω). 12 ◦
5 Results
We ﬁrst show that strategy-proofness and Pareto-eﬃciency are incompatible with
anonymity. We also show that the additional requirement of individual rationality
leads to an incompatibility with non-bossiness. We then show that these incom-
patibilities are tight by proving that top cycles rules satisfy all three of our central
axioms. The proofs of these results are in the appendix D.
Proposition 1. If N>2, no rule is strategy-proof, Pareto-eﬃcient and anony-
mous.
Proposition 2. If N>2, no rule is strategy-proof, Pareto-eﬃcient, individually
rational, and non-bossy.13
Next, we show that both Propositions 2 and 1 are tight. When we drop non-
bossiness or anonymity from the list of requirements, the incompatibility does not
persist, as evidenced by top cycles rules.
By deﬁnition top cycles rules are not anonymous. To see that they are bossy,
consider the following example.
12As evidenced by the above example, TC≺(R,ω) need not to be a competitive allocation.
13This is a corollary of Theorem 2 in (Bogomolnaia et al. 2005). We provide a direct proof in
the appendix.
15Example 3. Bossiness of top cycles rules: Let O = {a,b,c},N = {1,2,3},ω =
(a,b,c), and 1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3. Let R,R  ∈R N be such that,
R1 R2 R3
ab c   a   a




c   a a  
ab b   b
cc
.
Then, TC≺ selects the circled allocations above, showing that it is bossy. •
Proposition 3. For each priority order ≺, TC≺ is Pareto-eﬃcient and individ-
ually rational. That is, for each (R,ω) ∈R N × A and each ≺, TC≺(R,ω) ∈
PE(R) ∩ IR(R,ω).
Proof: By deﬁnition of TC≺,i ti sindividually rational.
We show that it is Pareto-eﬃcient using the conditions of the Departing Phase
in the algorithm. Consider the sequence of groups of people who leave at the ﬁrst
step. By condition (i) of the Departure Phase, each member of the ﬁrst group
leaves with one of his most preferred objects. By condition (ii) of the Departure
Phase, each of them can be made no better oﬀ. By the same reasoning, each
member of the second group leaves with one of his most preferred objects after
members of the ﬁrst group have left and can be made no better oﬀ without hurting
at least one member of the ﬁrst group. Continuing, each member of a group that
in Step 1 leaves with one of his most preferred objects after members of all the
previous groups have left and can be made no better oﬀ without hurting at least
one person who has left.
A similar argument applies to the subsequent steps. Those leaving in later
steps can be made no better oﬀ without hurting those who have left in prior steps.
Thus, TC≺ is Pareto-eﬃcient. 
Proposition 4. For each priority order ≺, TC≺ selects an allocation from the
weak core. That is, for each (R,ω) ∈R N×A and each ≺, TC≺(R,ω) ∈ CW(R,ω).
Proof: Suppose not. Then, there are (R,ω) ∈R N × A and S ⊆ N such that S
blocks α ≡ TC≺(R,ω). That is, there is β ∈ A such that β(S)=ω(S) and for
each i ∈ S, β(i) Pi α(i).
For each t and each i ∈ S,i fβ(i) ∈ Ot, then there is no j ∈ N such that i
points at him in Step t (i  −→
t
j)a n dβ(i) Pi ht(j).
Let ˆ t be the ﬁrst step at which there is i ∈ S such that i is part of a trading
cycle at the end of step ˆ t.O n c ei trades, his welfare is determined and he is made
neither better nor worse oﬀ during the remainder of the algorithm. Thus, he is
16indiﬀerent between the object that makes his ﬁrst trade for and the object he ends
up with. That is, hˆ t+1(i) Ii α(i). So β(i) Pi hˆ t+1(i). This implies that there is
j ∈ N such that i points at j in Step ˆ t (i −→
ˆ t
j)a n dβ(i) Pi hˆ t(j)=hˆ t+1(i). Thus,
β(i) / ∈ Oˆ t. However, since β(S)=ω(S), there is k ∈ S such that β(i)=ω(k)a n d
since ω(k) / ∈ Oˆ t, k is part of a trading cycle at some ˜ t<ˆ t. This contradicts the
deﬁnition of ˆ t. 
In order to show that for each ≺, TC≺ is strategy-proof, we make a preliminary
remark and state two key lemmas.
F o re a c hp r o b l e m( R,ω) ∈R N × A, the “state” of the algorithm at Step t is
summarized by the tuple (Ot,N t,h t+1,p t). Our remark and lemmas pertain to how
these tuples change in response to changes in the input problem. These lemmas
provide useful insight into the dynamics of the algorithm.
Remark 2. (Persistence) If i points at j at Step t, then he points at j as long
as j holds the same object. That is, if i −→
t j, then for every t  >tsuch that
ht (j)=ht −1(j)=ht −2(j)=... = ht(j), i −→
t  j.
Before we proceed to our ﬁrst lemma, we introduce some additional notation.
Let (R,ω) ∈R N × A and i ∈ N. At the Step t of the algorithm, let the set of
people connected to i, CONN(i,R,t), be those, including i, connected to i
via pt.T h a ti s ,
CONN(i,R,t)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
j ∈ Nt :








⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
.
Fix ω ∈ A and priority order ≺.L e t R ∈R N, i ∈ N,a n dR 
i ∈R .L e t
R  =( R 
i,R −i). For each ˆ t =0 ,1,...,l e thˆ t be the holding vector at Step ˆ t of the
algorithm for the problem (R,ω). Similarly deﬁne h 
ˆ t for the problem (R ,ω). We
also deﬁne, Oˆ t,O  
ˆ t, Nˆ t,N 
ˆ t,p ˆ t,p  
ˆ t,S ˆ t,S 
ˆ t, Uˆ t,a n dU 
ˆ t. Finally, for each i,j ∈ N,w e
indicate pˆ t(i)=j by i
R −→
ˆ t
j and p 








indicate pˆ t(i)  = j.
Let t be the step at which i either leaves or makes his ﬁrst trade under R.
Deﬁne t  similarly with respect to R .L e tt be the ﬁrst step at which i is satisﬁed
for exactly one of the two problems if such a number exists, and ∞ otherwise.
That is, i ∈ St and i ∈ U 
t, i ∈ Ut and i ∈ S 
t,o rt = ∞.14
14The last case, t = ∞, only occurs if t = t .
17Let t ≡ min{t,t ,t}. Then, t determines the ﬁrst period when i is satisﬁed
under R or R .
Our ﬁrst lemma states that up to Step t, there is no diﬀerence in the state of
the algorithm, regardless of whether i reports Ri or R 
i.
Lemma 1. (t equality) At t, for both R and R , the objects and people remaining,
as well as the holding vector and previous step’s pointing vector, except for i’s
component, are the same. That is,
Ot Nt ht














While the formal proof is in appendix B, Example 4 should help the reader
build some intuition with regards to Lemma 1.
Example 4. Lemma t-equality.
Let N = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}, ω =( a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h), and R ∈R N be as
follows.
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
ce abc e bd bef e dfg ch
fh
Let ≺ be such that 1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3 ≺ 4 ≺ 5 ≺ 7 ≺ 8. Figure 3. shows the pointing
stages of Step 1, 2, and 3. Notice that 1 does not trade until Step 3. Suppose
that, instead of R1, 1 reports R 
1 such that he is unsatisﬁed. We will show that
the departure, pointing, and trading stages remain unaﬀected until 1 trades under
one of the two announcements.
Since 1 is unsatisﬁed, no one leaves in the departure phase of Step 1 under
R (≡ (R 
1,R −1)). Moreover, each person who points at 1 under R points at him
under R . That is, only 2 points at 1. All but 1 point the same under R and
R . Therefore, all the trading cycles not involving 1 that are realized under R are
also realized under R . If 1 is not part of a cycle (then he does not trade) under
R , then the objects, people, and holdings are the same under R and R  at the
beginning of Step 2.
If 1 is unsatisﬁed under R  in Step 2, the departure stage of Step 2 is the same
under R and R . Since 1 is unsatisﬁed under R and R , people who point at 1 do
not change. That is, 2 still points at 1. All but 1 again point in the same way. All
the trading cycles not involving 1 are realized. If 1 does not trade under R  then
the objects, people, and holdings are the same under R and R  at the beginning
of Step 3.
18Following the same argument as in the previous steps, we conclude that under
R and R  the departure phase is the same. And until 1 trades, the objects, people,
and holdings are the same at the beginning of the the next Step. Note that the
t-equality Lemma does not say anything about the pointing phase and trading
phase of Step 3 when 1 trades. •
f
1 a 2 b 8 h
6 f
3 c
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Step 1: Step 2:
Figure 3: Example of t-equality Lemma. If 1 reports R 
1 rather than R1,t h e n
each stage in Step 1 and Step 2 remain the same.
For each R0 ∈R ,a n de a c ha ∈ O, let the indiﬀerence class of a at R0,
I(a,R0),b e
I(a,R0)={b ∈ O | bI 0 a}.
Given R0 ∈R ,a n da ∈ O, let the local push-up of R0 at a,Ra↑
0 ∈Rbe the
relation that diﬀers from R0 only in that it ranks a above all objects in I(a,R0),
as shown in Figure 3. That is,
R0|O\{a} = R
a↑
0 |O\{a} and for each b ∈ O \{ a},
bP 0 a ⇒ bP a↑
0 a and
aR 0 b ⇒ aP a↑
0 b.
To prove that TC≺ is strategy-proof we will have to consider all possible prefer-
ence relations that a person can misreport. However, we can split all the available




Figure 4: Local push-up of a preference relation: Given R0 ∈Rand a ∈ O,
the local push-up of R0 at a, R
a↑
0 is as shown above.
under which the person is not indiﬀerent between the object that he is assigned
and any other object. The second category consists of all the remaining preference
relations. The following lemma implies that for each preference relation in the
second category, we can ﬁnd a preference relation in the ﬁrst category such that
the person is assigned the same object regardless of which of the two preference
relations he reports. We use this to prove that TC≺ is strategy-proof since it
means that we only need to rule out successful misreports from the ﬁrst category.
Consider the case in which i’s preference relation changes from Ri to R 
i.M o r e -
over, R 
i is a local push-up of Ri at a.N o t e t h a t i f t<min{t,t }, i becomes
satisﬁed in only one of the two problems. Since the only diﬀerence between these
preference relations is that I(a,R 
i) ⊂ I(a,Ri), then, by the t equality lemma,
τi(R ,O  
t) ⊂ τi(R,Ot). Moreover, i ∈ St, i ∈ U 
t,a n da ∈ τi(R,Ot) ∩ τi(R ,O  
t).
We use this fact to prove the following lemma. In the proof, we follow the same
structure as in the proof of the t equality lemma. That is, we establish the state
of the algorithm between t and min{t,t }, and then between t and t .
Lemma 2. (Invariance) If the preference relation of a person changes to a lo-
cal push-up of his original preference at his assignment, then his assignment is
unchanged. That is, if α = TC≺(R,ω), R 
i = R
α(i)↑
i , and α  = TC≺(R ,ω), then
α(i)=α (i).
Proof: By the t equality lemma and by the deﬁnition of Ri and R 
i,i ne a c hs t e p
before t, i points to the same person (holding the same object) under R or R .
Thus, Ot = O 
t, Nt = N 
t, ht = h 
t, and for each j ∈ Nt \{ i}, pt−1(j)=p 
t−1(j).
Since R 
i is a local push-up of Ri at αi, τ(R 
i,O t)={α(i)}⊆τ(Ri,O t).
The t equality lemma also implies that CONN(i,R,t−1) = CONN(i,R ,t− 1).
The rest of the proof proceeds as follows. First we show that at min{t,t },a n y











Figure 5: Pre-trade inclusion.
component of the allocation chosen under R is the same as his component of the
allocation chosen under allocation under R : α (i)=α(i).
Claim 1. (Pre-trade inclusion)15 For each ¨ t = t,...,min{t,t },16
(i) The objects and people remaining at ¨ t under R are a subset of those remaining
under R . Further, those remaining under R  but not under R are connected
to i. That is,
O¨ t ⊆ O 
¨ t,N ¨ t ⊆ N 
¨ t
O 
¨ t \ O¨ t ⊆ h¨ t(CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1)), and N 
¨ t \ N¨ t ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1).
(ii) Every person who is satisﬁed at ¨ t under R  is satisﬁed under R. Every person
who is not satisﬁed under R  but is satisﬁed under R is connected to i under
R . That is, S 
¨ t ⊆ S¨ t and S 
¨ t \ S¨ t ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1).
(iii) Every person not connected to i at ¨ t under R  points at the same person under
R as under R . That is, for each j ∈ N 
¨ t \ CONN(i,R ,¨ t), p¨ t(j)=p 
¨ t(j).
(iv) Every person not connected to i at ¨ t under R  holds the same object under R
as under R . That is, for each j ∈ N 
¨ t \ CONN(i,R ,¨ t), h¨ t+1(j)=h 
¨ t+1(j).
(v) The set of people connected to i under R is a subset of the people connected
to i under R . That is, CONN(i,R,¨ t) ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t).
While the formal proof is in appendix C, Example 5 should help the reader
build some intuition with regards to Claim 1.
15As illustrated in Figure 5.
16If t =m i n {t,t } statements (i) - (v) are implied by the t equality lemma.
21Example 5. Pre-trade Claim.
Let N = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}, ω =( a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h), and R ∈R N be as
follows.
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R 
1
abc c e e ade af h egh b
d ac
The Pre-trade Claim deals with situations where 1 reports, instead of R1,a
local push-up of R1 at his assignment TC≺(R,ω)(1) = b, R 
1. The Pre-trade Claim
says that at each step before 1 trades under R (≡ (R 
1,R −1)), the set of people
who point at 1 under R is a subset of the set of people who point at 1 under R .
Moreover, trades that do not involve 1 that occur under R occur under R  as well.
In this example, the departure stage of Step 1 is the same under R and R 
(ﬁgure 6.) In the pointing stage, since 1 is satisﬁed under R but not under R ,
more people point at 1 under R  than under R. Under R , 5 points at 1. In
addition, note that since 6 points at 1 under R, where 1 is satisﬁed, he also points
at 1 under R , where 1 is unsatisﬁed. Following this logic we can show that the
set of people who point at 1 under R is a subset of the set of people who point at
1 under R . Moreover, trading cycles that do not involve 1 are the same under R
and R . In this case, 7 points at 8 and 8 points at 7. Therefore, only trades that
involve 1 under R might not happen under R . Since under R  1 trades in Step 1,
the Pre-trade Claim does not say anything about Step 2. •
If t  ≤ t,b ypre-trade inclusion,a n dt h et equality lemma, Ot ⊆ O 
t and
O 
t ⊆ O 
t .T h u s , α(i) ∈ O 
t . Since i is part of a trading cycle at Step t  and by
deﬁnition of R , i points in Step t  at whoever holds α(i)a tt. Then, i is assigned
one of his most preferred objects in O 
t  which is uniquely α(i). Thus, α (i)=α(i).
We only need to show that α(i)=α (i)w h e nt  >t . We ﬁrst state the following
claim.
Claim 2. (Post-trade inclusion) For each ¨ t ∈{ t..,t },
(i)
O¨ t ⊆ O 
¨ t,N ¨ t ⊆ N 
¨ t,
O 
¨ t \ O¨ t ⊆ h¨ t(CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1)), and N 
¨ t \ N¨ t ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1) ,
(ii) S 
¨ t ⊆ S¨ t and S 
¨ t \ S¨ t ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1),
(iii) For each j ∈ N 
¨ t \ CONN(i,R ,¨ t), p¨ t(j)=p 
¨ t(j), and
(iv) For each j ∈ N 
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Figure 6: Example of Pre-trade Claim. If 1 reports R 
1 rather than R1, the set
of people who point at 1 has under R  is a superset of those who point at him under R.
Moreover, trades that do not involve 1 that are realized under R are also realized under
R .
The proof of this claim is similar to that of pre-trade inclusion and is also
included in the appendix C, Example 6 should help the reader build some intuition
with regards to Claim 2.
Example 6. Post-trade Claim.
Let N = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}, ω =( a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h), and R ∈R N be as
follows.
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R 
1
bc ad g acde adef b dgh g c
bd ab
Like the Pre-trade Claim, the Post-trade Claim deals with situations where 1
reports R 
1,alocal push-up of R1 at his assignment TC≺(R,ω)(1) = c, rather than
R1 (ﬁgure 7.) It provides us with a description of each step between the step at
which 1 trades under R and the step that he trades under R (≡ (R 
1,R −1)). The
Post-trade Claim says that before 1 trades under R , the set of people who point
at 1 under R is a subset of those who point at 1 under R . Moreover, trades that
do not involve 1 that occur under R also occur under R . Therefore, the people
23that trade under R is a superset of those who trade under R . Finally, since there
is less trade under R, the sets of objects and people remaining at a particular step
under R are subsets of the objects and people remaining at the same step under
R .
The claim does not say anything about Step 1 because 1 has not traded yet.
By the t-equality lemma, we know that the departure stage of Step 1 is the same
under R and R  and in the pointing stage, everyone but 1 points in the same way
under R and R . In this example, 1 trades under R but not under R .I nS t e p2 ,
the departure phase is the same. In the pointing stage, since 1 is satisﬁed under R
but not under R , 1 has more people who point at him under R . Under R ,4a n d
5 point at 1. Therefore, the set of people who point at 1 under R is a subset of
those who point at 1 under R . Even though it is not shown in this example, using
the same reasoning as in the Pre-trade Claim, trading cycles that do not involve 1
that occur under R also occur under R  and at least as many people trade under
R as under R . Since under R  1 trades in Step 2, the Post-trade Claim does not
say anything about Step 3. •
Suppose α (i)  = α(i). Since i is assigned α(i) under R, there is ˜ t such that
h˜ t+1(i)=α(i). By post-trade inclusion, ˜ t<t  . Since τ(R 





j ∈ N 
˜ t such that h 
˜ t(j)=α(i). Since α (i)  = α(i), h 
˜ t+1(i)  = α(i). Thus
j/ ∈ CONN(i,R ,˜ t+1). Thusbypost-trade inclusion, h˜ t(j)=h 
˜ t(j)=α(i). Since






















jr( = i). This contradicts
h˜ t(i)=α(i). ♣
We are now ready to show that TC≺ is strategy-proof.
Proposition 5. For priority order ≺, TC≺(R,ω) is strategy-proof.
Proof: Suppose that TC≺ is not strategy-proof. Then, there is (R,ω) ∈R N ×A,
i ∈ N and R 
i ∈Rsuch that TC≺(R 
i,R −i,ω)(i) Pi TC≺(R,ω)(i). Let α ≡
TC≺(R,ω)a n dα  ≡ TC≺(R 
i,R −i,ω). By the invariance lemma, we only need to
consider R 





i ,R −i,ω)(i)=α (i) and thus, TC≺(R
α (i)↑
i ,R −i,ω)(i) Pi α(i).
Deﬁne t,t ,t, and t as in the proof of the invariance lemma. Since α (i)  =
ω(i),α  (i) P  
i ω(i)a n df o re a c h¨ t ≤ t , i ∈ U 
¨ t. We consider the following cases.
Case 1: t = t ≤ t . In this case, i ∈ St.T h a t i s , ω(i) ∈ τ(Ri,O t). By the t
equality lemma, Ot = O 
t. Since α (i) ∈ O 
t, α (i) ∈ Ot.T h u s ,ω(i) Ri α (i)a n db y
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Figure 7: Example of Post-trade Claim. If 1 reports R 
1 rather than R1,t h e
set of people who point at him has under R  includes those who point at him under R.
Moreover, trades that do not involve 1 are realized under R are also realized under R .
25Case 2: t = t  <t .B y t h e t equality lemma, Ot  = O 
t , Nt  = N 
t , and for
each j ∈ N 
t  \{ i}, pt (j)=p 
t (j)a n dht (j)=h 
t (j). Since i trades under R 
at t  and by deﬁnition of R , I(α (i),R i)={α (i)},t h e n{h 
t +1(i)} = {α (i)} =
τ(R 
i,O  














t i and h 









t i and ht(j1)=α (i). By persistence,
ht+1(i) Ri α (i).
Case 3: t = t ≤ t . Since ht+1(i) ∈ τ(Ri,O t)a n dht+1(i) Ii α(i), α(i) ∈ τ(Ri,O t).
Since α (i) ∈ O 
t and by the t equality lemma O 
t = Ot we have α (i) ∈ Ot.T h u s ,
α(i) Ri α (i). 
6 Generality of our model
In this section, we show that the model that we have studied is general enough
to include the problems where there may or may not be a private endowment in
addition to a social endowment (Hylland and Zeckhauser 1979, Abdulkadiro˘ glu
and S¨ onmez 1999).
Let ˜ O be a set of objects and ˜ N be a set of people. Let ∅ / ∈ ˜ O be the null
object.T h e private endowment, ˜ ω : ˜ N → ˜ O ∪{ ∅}, is such that for each
i,j ∈ ˜ N,˜ ω(i)  =˜ ω(j) unless ˜ ω(i)=∅.L e t˜ R be the set of preference relations
over ˜ O.L e t˜ R ∈ ˜ R
˜ N. The tuple ( ˜ O, ˜ N,˜ ω, ˜ R) deﬁnes a problem. We show how
this problem can be encoded as a problem in our original model without social
endowments.
Deﬁne (O,N,ω,R) as follows. For each a ∈ ˜ O \ ˜ ω( ˜ N), we introduce ia,a
“dummy person” with degenerate preferences, Ria = I0.F o re a c hi ∈ ˜ N such that
˜ ω(i)=∅, we introduce di, a “dummy object” which every person considers to be
worse than any object in ˜ O. For each person in ˜ N, his preferences over ˜ O are
kept the same. That is,
O ≡ ˜ O ∪{ di :f o re a c hi ∈ ˜ N such that ˜ ω(i)=∅},
N ≡ ˜ N ∪{ ia :f o re a c ha ∈ ˜ O \ ˜ ω( ˜ N)},




˜ ω(i)i f i ∈ ˜ N and ˜ ω(i)  = ∅
di if i ∈ ˜ N and ˜ ω(i)=∅
a if i = ia, and
R ∈R N is such that for each i ∈ ˜ N, Ri| ˜ O = ˜ Ri| ˜ O, and for each dj ∈ O \ ˜ O and
each a ∈ ˜ O,a Pi dj.
When the preferences are strict and the problem includes private endowment,
the top cycles rule associated with a priority coincides with the house for turn rule
26associated with the same priority.17 For the same domain of preferences with no
public endowment, our family of rules collapses to the core. Moreover, when there
is no private endowment, the top cycles rule associated with a priority coincides
with the serial dictatorship rule associated with the same priority.
We also point out that the top cycles rules described in this paper can be
generalized to problems in which each person may be endowed with any number
of objects (P´ apai 2000).
For school choice problems, the objects that have to be allocated among stu-
dents are seats at schools. These problems have three important characteristics:
First, each seat at a school can be modeled as a copy of the same objects. Second,
students are indiﬀerent between seats at the same school, but not between seats
at diﬀerent schools. Finally, schools have weak priorities over students. An adap-
tation of the top trading algorithm can be used in this environment by treating
each school’s priority as an “inheritance heirarchy”(P´ apai 2000, Kesten 2006).
Appendices
A A formal deﬁnition of the Top Cycles algo-
rithm
For t =0 ,1,2,...,i nS t e pt, we deﬁne the Ot ⊆ O,t h eNt ⊆ N,a n d
ht+1 : Nt → Ot. We also deﬁne, for each i ∈ Nt,t h ept(i).
Let O0 ≡ O, N0 ≡ N,a n dh1 ≡ ω.
At step t =1 ,2,..., we get (Ot,N t,h t+1,p t) as follows.
Departure phase:
To determine who leaves we use an iterative procedure. Let G1
t be the largest
group in Nt−1 such that:
i) What each i ∈ G1
t holds is among his most preferred objects:
ht(i) ∈ τ(Ri,h t(Nt−1))
ii) The most preferred objects of the group are hold by them:
τ(Ri,h t(Nt−1)) ⊆ ht(G
1
t)
17This rule is known in the literature as You request my house I get your turn rule
(Abdulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez 1999).
27Among the remaining people, Nt−1 \ G1
t we determine G2
t using the same
conditions. We continue until we ﬁnd K ∈{ 1,...,|Nt−1|} such that GK
t = ∅
and for each k<K , Gk
t  = ∅. Then, each i ∈∪ K
k=1Gk
t, departs with ht(i).
That is, TC≺(R,ω)(i) ≡ ht(i). Further,




Note that the if K = 1 the set of people departing is empty, then Nt = Nt−1
and Ot = Ot−1.
Pointing phase:
We determine pt in stages, as follows: For each i ∈ Nt,l e ti’s candidate
pointees, Ci,t≡{ j ∈ Nt : ht(j) ∈ τ(Ri,O t)}, be the people that hold one
of i’s most preferred objects.
Stage 1) If t  = 1, we ﬁrst consider i ∈ Nt such that i’s pointee in Step t − 1h a s
not departed and holds the same object as he did at Step t − 1. Then,
i points at the same person in Step t as well. That is, if t  =1 ,f o re a c h
i ∈ Nt such that i −→
t−1 j ∈ Nt,a n dht(j)=ht−1(j), we have i −→
t j.
Stage 2) We consider i ∈ Nt that has only one candidate pointee. He points
at his unique candidate pointee. That is, for each i ∈ Nt such that
Ci,t = {j},w eh a v ei −→
t j.
Stage 3) We consider i ∈ Nt with at least one unsatisﬁed candidate pointee. He
points at the unsatisﬁed candidate pointee with highest priority.19 That
is,
pt(i) ≡ arg ≺ -max
j∈Ci,t\St
j.20
Stage 4) We consider i ∈ Nt with only satisﬁed candidate pointees, at least one
of whom has an unsatisﬁed pointee, C1
i,t ≡{ j ∈ Ci,t : j −→
t Ut}⊆St.
Then i points at the satisﬁed candidate whose unsatisﬁed pointee has
highest priority (breaking ties with respect to ≺). That is, pt(i)=Jt(i),
where Jt(i) ≡ arg ≺ -max
j∈C1
i,t
pt(j)a n d|Jt(i)| = 1. In case two or more
19The order within a stage is unimportant. In addition, since stages are performed sequentially,
if pt(i) is deﬁned at Stage k,t h e npt(pt(i)) is deﬁned at Stage k  <k .F u r t h e r ,pt(i) is independent
of pt(j)i fpt(j)i sd e ﬁ n e da tS t a g ek   ≥ k.
20We deﬁne arg ≺ -max
j∈Ci,t\St
j as the person that maximizes the priority ≺. In general, for each
f : X → N and each X  ⊆ X, we deﬁne arg ≺ -max
j∈X f(j) ≡ i ∈ X  such that for each
j ∈ X  \{ i},f(i) ≺ f(j).
28of these satisﬁed candidates points at the unsatisﬁed pointee with the
highest priority (|Jt(i)| > 1), i points at the satisﬁed candidate with
the highest priority. That is, pt(i) ≡ arg ≺ -max
j∈Jt(i)
j.
Stage 5) We consider i ∈ Nt whose candidate pointees are all satisﬁed and have
satisﬁed pointees, at least one of whom has an unsatisﬁed pointee. He
points at the candidate who points at the person who points at the
unsatisﬁed person with highest priority (again, breaking ties with ≺).
That is,
C2
i,t ≡{ j ∈ Ci,t : j −→
t −→
t Ut}⊆St,




pt(i) ≡ arg ≺ -max
j∈Jt(i)
j.
Stage ...) The process is repeated until for each i ∈ Nt, pt(i) is deﬁned.
By deﬁnition of the departure phase, each i ∈ Nt points, directly or indirectly,
at an unsatisﬁed person.21 Thus, the pointing phase terminates in a ﬁnite
number of stages.
Trading phase:





t i1. Further, each i ∈ Nt is a member of at most one cycle. We get ht+1
by performing the trades prescribed by each cycle. That is, for each cycle,
{i1,i 2,...,i s},a n de a c hk =1 ,...s, ht+1(ik−1)=ht(ik). For each i ∈ Nt
who is not in a cycle, ht+1(i)=ht(i).
The algorithm terminates at Step ˚ t such that N˚ t = ∅.
B Proofs of the t-equality Lemma
Lemma 1: (t equality) At t, for both R and R , the objects and people remaining,
as well as the holding vector and previous step’s pointing vector, except for i’s
component, are the same. That is,
Ot Nt ht














21This condition implies that each cycle includes at least one unsatisﬁed person.
29Proof: Note that if in Step 1, i ∈ S1 and i ∈ S 
1, the statement of this Lemma is
vacuously satisﬁed. Then, assume i ∈ U1 and i ∈ U 
1.
Step 1: Since i ∈ U1 and i ∈ U 
1, and for each j ∈ N \{ i}, Rj = R 
j and h1(j)=
h 
1(j)=ω(j), we have S0 = S 
0.T h u s ,O1 = O 
1 and N1 = N 
1. Therefore, for
each j ∈ N1 \{ i}, p1(j)=p 
1(j).
If 1 <t , i does not trade at Step 1 under either R or R . Therefore, the
cycles formed under p1 and p 
1 are the same and do not involve i. Then, for
each j ∈ N1, h2(j)=h 
2(j).
Step 2: Since i ∈ U1 and i ∈ U 
1, and for each j ∈ N1 \{ i},R j|O1 = R 
j|O1 and
h2(j)=h 
2(j), we have S1 = S 
1.T h u s ,O2 = O 
2 and N2 = N 
2.
As an induction hypothesis, suppose that for some ¨ t<t , O¨ t = O 
¨ t, N¨ t = N 
¨ t,
h¨ t = h 
¨ t, and for each j ∈ N¨ t \{ i}, p¨ t−1(j)=p 
¨ t−1(j).
Step ¨ t +1 :
W es h o wt h a tf o r¨ t<t , O¨ t+1 = O 
¨ t+1, N¨ t+1 = N 
¨ t+1, h¨ t+1 = h 
¨ t+1, and for each
j ∈ N¨ t \{ i}, p¨ t(j)=p 
¨ t(j).
Since ¨ t<t , i ∈ U¨ t and i ∈ U 
¨ t. In addition, by our induction hypothesis,
O¨ t = O 
¨ t, N¨ t = N 
¨ t, h¨ t = h 
¨ t and Rj|O¨ t = R 
j|O¨ t.T h u s ,f o re a c hj ∈ N¨ t \{ i},
p¨ t(j)=p 
¨ t(j).
Since ¨ t<t , i does not trade under R or R  at ¨ t. Therefore, the cycles formed
by p¨ t and p 
¨ t are the same and do not involve i. Thus, for each j ∈ N¨ t,
h¨ t+1(j)=h 
t+1(j). Also, O¨ t+1 = O 
¨ t+1 and N¨ t+1 = N 
¨ t+1.
C Proof of the “inclusion” Claims
Claim 1: (Pre-trade inclusion) For each ¨ t = t,...,min{t,t },
(i) The objects and people remaining at ¨ t under R are a subset of those remaining
under R . Further, those remaining under R  but not under R are connected
to i. That is,
O¨ t ⊆ O 
¨ t,N ¨ t ⊆ N 
¨ t
O 
¨ t \ O¨ t ⊆ h¨ t(CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1)), and N 
¨ t \ N¨ t ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1).
(ii) Every person who is satisﬁed at ¨ t under R  is satisﬁed under R. Every person
who is not satisﬁed under R  but is satisﬁed under R is connected to i under
R . That is, S 
¨ t ⊆ S¨ t and S 
¨ t \ S¨ t ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1).
30(iii) Every person not connected to i at ¨ t under R  points at the same person under
R as under R . That is, for each j ∈ N 
¨ t \ CONN(i,R ,¨ t), p¨ t(j)=p 
¨ t(j).
(iv) Every person not connected to i at ¨ t under R  holds the same object under R
as under R . That is, for each j ∈ N 
¨ t \ CONN(i,R ,¨ t), h¨ t+1(j)=h 
¨ t+1(j).
(v) The set of people connected to i under R is a subset of the people connected
to i under R . That is, CONN(i,R,¨ t) ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t).
Proof: Suppose t  = min{t,t }.T h e nt = t. Since τ(R 
i,O t)={α(i)}, t <t  ,a n d
by deﬁnition of t, i ∈ U 
t and i ∈ St.
Let ¨ t = t. Statements (i) and (ii), for t, are implied by the t equality lemma.
Further, St = S 
t ∪{ i}.
We now prove statement (iii), for t, by following the progression of the pointing
phase.22 By the t equality lemma, each j ∈ Nt \{ i} pointed at the same person
under R as he did under R  at step t − 1.
Stage 1) At the beginning of the pointing phase we consider people who were pointing
at someone who remains in N¯ t and holds the same object. In particular, we
consider j ∈ N 




k ∈ N 



















Stage 2) Now we consider people who have a unique most preferred object. They
point at the same person under R as under R .
Stage 3) Next, we consider the people who point at unsatisﬁed people under R .I n
particular, j ∈ N 




k ∈ U 
t. Since j/ ∈
CONN(i,R ,t), k/ ∈ CONN(i,R ,t). Since k ∈ U 
t and St = S 
t ∪{ i},




m  = k. Then,
m ∈ Ut ⊆ U 
t and so ht(m)=h 











j jk ∈ U 
t k ∈ Ut
m ≺ k ∈
Ut
m ≺ k ∈
Stage 4) We now consider the people who point at satisﬁed people with unsatisﬁed
pointees, under R . In particular, we consider j ∈ N 










k ∈ U 
t. Then, by (ii), j1 ∈ St.
By the preceding arguments, j1
R −→
t
k and k ∈ Ut. Suppose j
R −→
t
m1  = j1.I f
m1 ∈ Ut,t h e nht(m1)=h 
t(m1)=ω(m1)a n dm1 ∈ U 






t.S om1 ∈ St and m1
R −→
t
m2 such that m2 ∈ Ut and m2 ≺ k. Then,
m2 ∈ U 





2 ∈ U 
t such that m 
2   m2 ≺ k. 23 By the t
equality lemma, ht(m1)=h 


























Stage 5) Now we consider the people who point at satisﬁed people with satisﬁed
pointees whose pointees are unsatisﬁed, under R . Particularly, consider
j ∈ N 














k ∈ U 
t.
Then, j1,j 2 ∈ St.






k ∈ Ut. Suppose j
R −→
t
m1  = j1.
If m1 ∈ Ut,t h e nht(m1)=h 
t(m1)=ω(m1)a n dm1 ∈ U 
t. But this contra-











m2.I fm2 ∈ Ut,t h e nht(m2)=h 

















t.S o m2 ∈ St.B y t h e
t equality lemma, ht(m2)=h 
t(m2). Since k ∈ Ut, m2
R −→
t
m3 ∈ Ut and
m3 ≺ k. Then, m3 ∈ U 




ˆ m3 ∈ U 





















3.N o t et h a tm 
2 ∈ S 




















2,w eh a v em 
3 ∈ U 
t and m 
3 ≺ ˆ m3.













ˆ m3   m3
m 
3   ˆ m3   m3 ≺ k
Stage ...) Repeating this argument for the rest of the pointing phase, we show (iii).
We show that (v) CONN(i,R,t) ⊆ CONN(i,R ,t) is a consequence of (iii). To
see this, suppose j ∈ CONN(i,R,t) \ CONN(i,R ,t). Then, there is a sequence

























j2 and j2 / ∈ CONN(i,R ,t). Repeating the argument r times,















Finally, we prove (iv) for Step t. We show that for each j ∈ N 
t\CONN(i,R ,t),
ht+1(j)=h 
t+1(j). Note that since at t<t  , i does not trade. Then, no trad-
ing cycle under R  involves i.S o , n o trading cycle involves any member of
CONN(i,R ,t). That is, for each trading cycle C  ⊂ N 
t, CONN(i,R ,t)∩C  = ∅.
By (iii) and since Nt = N 
t”,w eh a v eC  ⊂ Nt is also a trading cycle under R.
Therefore, for each j ∈ N 
t \CONN(i,R ,t), h 
t+1(j)=ht+1(j). Moreover, for each
j ∈ CONN(i,R ,t), h 
t+1(j)=h 
t(j).
As an induction hypothesis, suppose that for some ¨ t ∈{ t,...,min{t,t }−1},
(i)
O¨ t ⊆ O 
¨ t,N ¨ t ⊆ N 
¨ t
O 
¨ t \ O¨ t ⊆ h¨ t(CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1)), and N 
¨ t \ N¨ t ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1),
(ii) S 
¨ t ⊆ S¨ t and S 
¨ t \ S¨ t ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1),
(iii) For each j ∈ N 
¨ t \ CONN(i,R ,¨ t), p¨ t(j)=p 
¨ t(j),
(iv) For each j ∈ N 
¨ t \ CONN(i,R ,¨ t), h¨ t+1(j)=h 
¨ t+1(j), and
(v) CONN(i,R,¨ t) ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t).
We prove that these statements are true of ¨ t+1. To prove (i) and (ii) for ¨ t+1,
note that by (iv) and (v) of the induction hypothesis,i fC ∈ N¨ t is a trading cycle
under R and is not a trading cycle under R ,t h e nC ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t). Thus, at
Step ¨ t + 1, we have statements (i) and (ii).
We now prove (iii), for ¨ t+1, by following the progression of the pointing phase
just as in the case of t.
Stage 1) We consider people whose pointee at ¨ t remains at ¨ t + 1 and holds the same
object under R as R . In particular, we consider j ∈ N 





k ∈ N 
¨ t and h 
¨ t+1(k)=h 








k and h¨ t+1(k)=h¨ t(k)=h 




34Stage 2) Now we consider people who have a unique most preferred object. For each
j ∈ N 
¨ t+1 \ CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 ) ,i fτ(Rj,O  





¨ t+1(a) / ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 ) . T h u s ,a ∈ O¨ t+1 and so
p¨ t+1(j)=p 
¨ t+1(j).
Stage 3) Next, we consider the people with unsatisﬁed pointees under R .I n p a r -
ticular, j ∈ N 




k ∈ U 
¨ t. Since j/ ∈
CONN(i,R ,¨ t+1), k/ ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t+1). Since k ∈ U 
¨ t+1 and S¨ t+1\S 
¨ t+1 ⊆





m  = k. Then, m ∈ U¨ t+1 ⊆ U 
¨ t+1 and so h¨ t+1(m)=h 
¨ t+1(m)=ω(m)








j jk ∈ U 
t k ∈ Ut
m ≺ k ∈
Ut
m ≺ k ∈
Stage 4) We now consider the people who point at satisﬁed people with unsatisﬁed
pointees, under R . In particular, we consider j ∈ N 










k ∈ U 
¨ t+1. Then, by (ii), j1 ∈ S¨ t+1.
By the preceding arguments, j1
R −→
¨ t+1
k and k ∈ U¨ t+1. Suppose j
R −→
¨ t+1
m1  = j1.





:I fm1 ∈ U¨ t+1,t h e nm1 ∈ U 










j1 ∈ S 







m1 and k ∈ U¨ t+1,t h e nm2 ∈ U¨ t+1 and
m2   k. Then, m2 ∈ U 
¨ t+1. Further, either [m2 ≺ k]o r[ m2 = k and














35m2 ∈ U 
¨ t+1,w eh a v em 
2 ∈ U 
¨ t+1 and m 
2 ≺ m2. Then, m 































:L e ta ≡ h¨ t+1(m1). By the induction hypothesis, since h 
¨ t+1(m1)  = a,
m1 ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t). Thus, m1 ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t + 1). Further, m1 ∈
S¨ t+1. Since O¨ t+1 ⊆ O 
¨ t+1, there is ˆ m ∈ N 








m1,w eh a v em2 ∈ U¨ t+1 ⊆ U 
¨ t+1 and
m2 ≺ k.




ˆ m,ˆ m ∈ S 
¨ t+1. Since h¨ t+1(ˆ m)  = a,b yt h einduction hy-
pothesis,ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t + 1). So there is a ﬁrst ˆ t such that
ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,ˆ t). Then, hˆ t(ˆ m)=h 
ˆ t(ˆ m)=a,a n dˆ m ∈ S 
ˆ t ⊆ Sˆ t.
Now we consider the ﬁrst ˇ t, which is between ˆ t and ¨ t + 1, such that
hˇ t(m1)= a. Then, m1
R −→
ˇ t−1
Sˇ t−1 which contradicts m2 ∈ U¨ t+1 ⊆ Uˇ t−1.
36(between ˆ t and ¨ t +1 )




m2 ∈ Uˇ t−1 m1










Step ˇ t − 1:
i
ˆ m(a)








Stage 5) Next we consider the people who point at satisﬁed people whose pointees
satisﬁed and have unsatisﬁed pointees, under R . Particularly, consider j ∈
N 














k ∈ U 
¨ t+1. Then, j1,j 2 ∈ S¨ t+1.






k ∈ U¨ t+1. Suppose j
R −→
t












:I fm1 ∈ U¨ t+1,t h e nm1 ∈ U 










j1 ∈ S 
¨ t+1.T h u s ,m1 ∈ S¨ t+1.
Two sub-cases are as follows:
h 
¨ t+1(m2)=h¨ t+1(m2):I fm2 ∈ U¨ t+1,t h e nm2 ∈ U 
¨ t+1 and h¨ t+1(m2)=
h 













j1 ∈ S 




m1  = j1, m3 ∈ U¨ t+1. Further, m3 ∈ U 
¨ t+1 and either














3  = m3: Since m3 ∈ U 
¨ t+1, m 
3 ∈ U 
¨ t+1 and
m 














j1  = m1,w eh a v em 












3. Since m3 ∈ U 
¨ t+1,ˆ m3 ∈ U 
¨ t+1
and ˆ m3   m3. Since m 






2,a n dˆ m3 ∈ U 
¨ t+1,w e
have m 
3 ∈ U 
¨ t+1 and m 
3   ˆ m3.T h u s , m 














ˆ m3   m3
m 
3   ˆ m3   m3 ≺ k
h 
¨ t+1(m2)  = h¨ t+1(m2):L e t a ≡ h¨ t+1(m2). By the induction hy-
pothesis, since h 




m3 ∈ U¨ t+1 ⊆ U 
¨ t+1.
Since O¨ t+1 ⊆ O 
¨ t+1, there is ˆ m ∈ N 
¨ t+1 such that h 
¨ t+1(ˆ m)=a and by
the induction hypothesis,ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 ) .










¨ t+1,a n dˆ m ∈ S 
¨ t+1.
Since h¨ t+1(ˆ m)  = a and since there is a ﬁrst ˆ t such that ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,ˆ t),
hˆ t(ˆ m)=h 
ˆ t(ˆ m)=a,a n dˆ m ∈ S 
ˆ t ⊆ Sˆ t.
38Now consider the ﬁrst ˇ t, which is between ˆ t and ¨ t + 1, such that
hˇ t(m2)= a. Then, m2
R −→
ˇ t−1






m3 ∈ Uˇ t−1 m2







Step ˇ t − 1:



















:L e ta ≡ h¨ t+1(m1). Since h 
¨ t+1(m1)  = a, m1 ∈ S¨ t+1. Since O¨ t+1 ⊆ O 
¨ t+1,
there is ˆ m ∈ N 
¨ t+1 such that h 




j1,w eh a v e
that ˆ m ∈ S 





¨ t+1. Since h¨ t+1(ˆ m)  = a,b yt h einduction
hypothesis,ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 )a n dt h e r ei saﬁ r s tˆ t such that
ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,ˆ t). Since ˆ m ∈ S 
¨ t+1 and p 
¨ t+1(ˆ m)=p 
ˆ t(ˆ m), we have
that ˆ m ∈ S 









Sˆ t. And for each ˆ ˆ t>ˆ t,w eh a v eˆ m
R −→
ˆ ˆ t
Sˆ ˆ t. Now consider







Sˇ t−1. However, if m2 ∈ U¨ t+1 ⊆ Uˇ t,t h e nm1
R −→
¨ t+1







In either case, we have reached a contradiction.
39(between ˆ t and ¨ t +1 )
i
ˆ m(a)






















ˇ m ∈ Sˆ t
m2 m∗
3 ∈ Uˇ t−1
Step ˇ t − 1:
...
˜ m2 ∈ Sˆ t ⊆ Sˇ t−1




Stage ...) Repeating this argument for the rest of the pointing phase we show (iii).
Now, we prove (v) for ¨ t+1. Suppose j ∈ CONN(i,R,¨ t+1)\CONN(i,R ,¨ t+1).
Then, there is {j1,j 2,...,jr,i}⊂N¨ t+1 ⊆ N 



















j1. Then, j1 / ∈




j2 and j2 / ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 ) .





this contradicts j/ ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 ) .
Finally, we prove (iv) for Step ¨ t +1 . W es h o wt h a tf o re a c hj ∈ N 
¨ t+1 \
CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 ) ,h¨ t+1(j)=h 
¨ t+1(j). By (iii) each trading cycle that does not
involve people connected to i under R  is also a trading cycle under R. Therefore,
for each j ∈ N 
¨ t+1 \ CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 ) ,h 
¨ t+2(j)=h¨ t+2(j). Moreover, for each
j ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 ) ,h 
¨ t+2(j)=h 
¨ t+1(j).  
Claim 2: (Post-trade inclusion)
For each ¨ t ∈{ t..,t },
40(i)
O¨ t ⊆ O 
¨ t,N ¨ t ⊆ N 
¨ t,
O 
¨ t \ O¨ t ⊆ h¨ t(CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1)), and N 
¨ t \ N¨ t ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1) ,
(ii) S 
¨ t ⊆ S¨ t and S 
¨ t \ S¨ t ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1),
(iii) For each j ∈ N 
¨ t \ CONN(i,R ,¨ t), p¨ t(j)=p 
¨ t(j), and
(iv) For each j ∈ N 
¨ t \ CONN(i,R ,¨ t), h¨ t+1(j)=h 
¨ t+1(j).
Proof: Let ¨ t = t + 1. First, we prove statements (i) and (ii) for t +1 . A t
t, i is a member of a trading cycle under R, but not under R .B y pre-trade
inclusion, each trading cycle that does not involve people connected to i under R 
is also a trading cycle under R. In addition, for each j ∈ N 
t \ CONN(i,R ,t),
ht+1(j)=h 
t+1(j). Thus, if C ∈ Nt is a trading cycle under R but not under R ,
then C ⊂ CONN(i,R ,t). Therefore, at Step t +1 ,Ot+1 ⊂ O 
t+1, O 
t+1 \ Ot+1 ⊆
ht+1(CONN(i,R ,t)), Nt+1 ⊂ N 
t+1,a n dN 
t+1 \ Nt+1 ⊆ CONN(i,R ,t). Further,
S 
t+1 ⊂ St+1 and St+1 \ S 
t+1 ⊆ CONN(i,R ,t).
We now prove (iii) for t+1, by following the progression of the pointing phase.
Stage 1) We ﬁrst consider people whos pointee in Step t remains in N 
t+1 and holds
the same object. In particular, we consider j ∈ N 




t k ∈ N 








t k and ht+1(k)=ht(k)=h 
t(k). Thus, by (ii), j
R −→
t+1 k.
Stage 2) Now we consider people who have a unique most preferred object. For each
j ∈ N 
t+1 \ CONN(i,R ,t+1 ) ,i fτ(Rj,O  





t+1(a) / ∈ CONN(i,R ,t+1 ) . T h u s ,a ∈ Ot+1 and so
pt+1(j)=p 
t+1(j).
Stage 3) Next, we consider the people with unsatisﬁed pointees under R . In partic-
ular, we consider j ∈ N 
t+1 \ CONN(i,R ,t+ 1) such that j
R 
−→
t+1 k ∈ U 
t+1.
Since j/ ∈ CONN(i,R ,t+1 ) ,k/ ∈ CONN(i,R ,t+ 1). Since k ∈ U 
t+1
and St+1 \ S 




t+1 m  = k. Then, m ∈ Ut+1 ⊂ U 
t+1 and so
ht+1(m)=h 




Stage 4) We now consider the people who point at satisﬁed people with unsatisﬁed









t+1 k ∈ U 
t+1. Then, by (ii), j1 ∈ St+1.
41By the preceding arguments, j1
R −→
t+1 k and k ∈ Ut+1. Suppose j
R −→
t+1 m1  = j1.





:I fm1 ∈ Ut+1,t h e nm1 ∈ U 





t+1 m1, which contradicts j
R 
−→
t+1 j1 ∈ S 
t+1.T h u s ,m1 ∈ St+1.
Suppose m1
R −→
t+1 m2. Since j
R −→
t+1 m1 and k ∈ Ut+1 and m2   k. Then,
m2 ∈ U 




t+1 m1,w eh a v em1  
R 
−→




2. Since m2 ∈ U 
t+1,
we have m 
2 / ∈ S 
t+1 and m 
2 ≺ m2. Then, m 









:L e ta ≡ ht+1(m1). By pre-trade inclusion, since h 
t+1(m1)  = a, m1 ∈
CONN(i,R ,t). Thus, m1 ∈ CONN(i,R ,t+ 1). Further, m1 ∈ St+1.
Since Ot+1 ⊆ O 
t+1, there is ˆ m ∈ N 




t+1 m2. Since j
R −→
t+1 m1,w eh a v em2 ∈ Ut+1 ⊆ U 
t+1 and m2 ≺ k.
Since j  
R 
−→
t+1 ˆ m,ˆ m ∈ S 
t+1.
Since ht+1(ˆ m)  = a,b ypre-trade inclusion,ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,t+1). So
t h e r ei saﬁ r s tˆ t such that ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,ˆ t), hˆ t(ˆ m)=h 
ˆ t(ˆ m)=a,
and ˆ m ∈ S 
ˆ t ⊆ Sˆ t.
Now we consider the ﬁrst ˇ t, which is between ˆ t and t + 1, such that
hˇ t(m1)= a. Then, m1
R −→
ˇ t−1
Sˇ t−1, which contradicts m2 ∈ Ut+1 ⊆ Uˇ t−1.
Stage 5) Now we consider the people who point at satisﬁed people whose pointees are
satisﬁed people with unsatisﬁed pointees under R . Particularly, we consider
j ∈ N 
t+1 \ CONN(i,R ,t+ 1) such that j
R 
−→









k ∈ U 
t+1. Then, by (ii), j1,j 2 ∈ St+1.






k ∈ Ut+1. Suppose j
R −→
t












:I fm1 ∈ Ut+1,t h e nm1 ∈ U 





t+1 m1, which contradicts j
R 
−→
t+1 j1 ∈ S 
t+1.T h u s ,m1 ∈ St+1.
Two sub-cases are as follows:
h 














t+1 j1 ∈ S 
t+1.T h u s ,m2 ∈ St+1.
Since j
R −→
t+1 m1  = j1, m3 ∈ Ut+1. Further, m3 ∈ U 
t+1 and either
[m3 ≺ k]o r[ m3 = k and m1 ≺ j1]. Since, j  
R 
−→








3  = m3: Since m3 ∈ U 
t+1, m 
3 ∈ U 
t+1 and
m 













j1  = m1,w eh a v em 










3. Since m3 ∈ U 
t+1,ˆ m3 ∈ U 
t+1
and ˆ m3   m3. Since m 





2,a n dˆ m3 ∈ U 
t+1,w e
have m 
3 ∈ U 
t+1 and m 
3 ≺ ˆ m3.T h u s , m 






t+1(m2)  = ht+1(m2):L e ta ≡ ht+1(m2). By pre-trade inclusion,
since h 
t+1(m2)  = a,w eh a v em2 ∈ St+1. Since j
R −→
¨ t
m1, m3 ∈ Ut+1 ⊆
U 
t+1.
Since Ot+1 ⊆ O 
t+1, there is ˆ m ∈ N 
t+1 such that h 
t+1(ˆ m)=a and by
pre-trade inclusion,ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,t+1 ) .
Since aI m1 ht+1(m1), and j  
R 
−→






t+1,a n dˆ m ∈ S 
t+1.
Since ht+1(ˆ m)  = a and since there is a ﬁrst ˆ t such that ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,ˆ t),
hˆ t(ˆ m)=h 
ˆ t(ˆ m)=a,a n dˆ m ∈ S 
ˆ t ⊆ Sˆ t.
Now consider the ﬁrst ˇ t, which is between ˆ t and t + 1, such that
hˇ t(m2)= a. Then, m2
R −→
ˇ t−1





:L e ta ≡ ht+1(m1). Subce h 
t+1(m1)  = a, m1 ∈ St+1. Since Ot+1 ⊆ O 
t+1,
there is ˆ m ∈ N 
t+1 such that h 
t+1(ˆ m)=a. Since j
R 
−→
t+1 j1,w eh a v e
that ˆ m ∈ S 




t+1. Since ht+1(ˆ m)  = a,b ypre-trade
inclusion,ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,t+ 1) and there is a ﬁrst ˆ t such that
ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,ˆ t). Since ˆ m ∈ S 
t+1 and p 
ˆ t(ˆ m)=p 
t+1(ˆ m), we have
that ˆ m ∈ S 









Sˆ t. And for each ˆ ˆ t>ˆ t,w eh a v eˆ m
R −→
ˆ ˆ t
Sˆ ˆ t. Now consider







Sˇ t−1. However, if m2 ∈ Ut+1 ⊆ Uˇ t,t h e nm1
R −→
t+1





In either case, we have reached a contradiction.
Stage ...) Repeating this argument for the rest of the pointing phase we show (iii).
Now, we prove (iv) for t+1. That is, we show that for each j ∈ N 
t+1\CONN(i,R ,t+1 ) ,
ht+1(j)=h 
t+1(j). Note that since at t +1<t  , i is not part of any trading cycle
under R .T h u si s ,n otrading cycle under R  involves people connected to i under
R . That is for each trading cycle C  ⊂ N 
t+1, CONN(i,R ,t+1 )∩ C  = ∅.B y
(iii), each trading cycle that does not involve people connected to i under R  is
also a trading cycle under R. Therefore, for each j ∈ N 
t+1 \ CONN(i,R ,t+1 ) ,
h 
t+2(j)=ht+2(j). Moreover, for each j ∈ CONN(i,R ,t+1 ) ,h 
t+2(j)=h 
t+1(j).
As an induction hypothesis, suppose that for some ¨ t ∈{ t,...,t  − 1},
(i)
O¨ t ⊆ O 
¨ t,N ¨ t ⊆ N 
¨ t
O 
¨ t \ O¨ t ⊆ h¨ t(CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1)), and N 
¨ t \ N¨ t ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1),
(ii) S 
¨ t ⊆ S¨ t and S 
¨ t \ S¨ t ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t − 1),
(iii) For each j ∈ N 
¨ t \ CONN(i,R ,¨ t), p¨ t(j)=p 
¨ t(j), and
(iv) For each j ∈ N 
¨ t \ CONN(i,R ,¨ t), h¨ t(j)=h 
¨ t(j), and
Now we prove that these statements are true of ¨ t +1. To prove (i) and (ii) for
¨ t + 1 note that by (iv) and (v) of the induction hypothesis,i fC ∈ N¨ t is a trading
cycle under R and is not a trading cycle under R ,t h e nC ⊆ CONN(i,R ,¨ t).
Thus, at Step ¨ t + 1, we have statements (i) and (ii).
44We now prove (iii), for ¨ t+1, by following the progression of the pointing phase
just as in the case of t +1 .
Stage 1) At the beginning of the pointing phase we consider people who were pointing
at someone who remains in N 
¨ t+1 and holds the same object. In particular,
we consider j ∈ N 
















h¨ t+1(k)=h¨ t(k)=h 




Stage 2) Now we consider people who have a unique most preferred object. For each
j ∈ N 
¨ t+1 \ CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 ) ,i fτ(Rj,O  





¨ t+1(a) / ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 ) . T h u s ,a ∈ O¨ t+1 and so
p¨ t+1(j)=p 
¨ t+1(j).
Stage 3) Next, we consider the people with unsatisﬁed pointees under R .I n p a r -
ticular, j ∈ N 




k ∈ U 
¨ t. Since j/ ∈
CONN(i,R ,¨ t+1), k/ ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t+1). Since k ∈ U 
¨ t+1 and S¨ t+1\S 
¨ t+1 ⊆





m  = k. Then, m ∈ U¨ t+1 ⊆ U 
¨ t+1 and so h¨ t+1(m)=h 
¨ t+1(m)=ω(m)





Stage 4) We now consider the people who point at satisﬁed people with unsatisﬁed
pointees, under R . In particular, we consider j ∈ N 










k ∈ U 
¨ t+1. Then, by (ii), j1 ∈ S¨ t+1.
By the preceding arguments, j1
R −→
¨ t+1
k and k ∈ U¨ t+1. Suppose j
R −→
¨ t+1
m1  = j1.





:I fm1 ∈ U¨ t+1,t h e nm1 ∈ U 










j1 ∈ S 







m1 and k ∈ U¨ t+1,t h e nm2 ∈ U¨ t+1 and
m2   k. Then, m2 ∈ U 
¨ t+1. Further, either [m2 ≺ k]o r[ m2 = k and














m2 ∈ U 
¨ t+1,w eh a v em 
2 ∈ U 
¨ t+1 and m 
2 ≺ m2. Then, m 










:L e ta ≡ h¨ t+1(m1). By the induction hypothesis, since h 
¨ t+1(m1)  = a,
m1 ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t). Thus, m1 ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t + 1). Further, m1 ∈
S¨ t+1. Since O¨ t+1 ⊆ O 
¨ t+1, there is ˆ m ∈ N 








m1,w eh a v em2 ∈ U¨ t+1 ⊆ U 
¨ t+1 and
m2 ≺ k.




ˆ m,ˆ m ∈ S 
¨ t+1.
Since h¨ t+1(ˆ m)  = a,b yt h einduction hypothesis,ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t +
1). So there is a ﬁrst ˆ t such that ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,ˆ t). Then, hˆ t(ˆ m)=
h 
ˆ t(ˆ m)=a,a n dˆ m ∈ S 
ˆ t ⊆ Sˆ t.
Now we consider the ﬁrst ˇ t, which is between ˆ t and ¨ t + 1, such that
hˇ t(m1)= a. Then, m1
R −→
ˇ t−1
Sˇ t−1 which contradicts m2 ∈ U¨ t+1 ⊆ Uˇ t−1.
Stage 5) Next we consider the people who point at satisﬁed people whose pointees
satisﬁed and have unsatisﬁed pointees, under R . Particularly, consider j ∈
N 














k ∈ U 
¨ t+1. Then, j1,j 2 ∈ S¨ t+1.






k ∈ U¨ t+1. Suppose j
R −→
t












:I fm1 ∈ U¨ t+1,t h e nm1 ∈ U 










j1 ∈ S 
¨ t+1.T h u s ,m1 ∈ S¨ t+1.
Two sub-cases are as follows:
h 
¨ t+1(m2)=h¨ t+1(m2):I fm2 ∈ U¨ t+1,t h e nm2 ∈ U 
¨ t+1 and h¨ t+1(m2)=
h 













j1 ∈ S 




m1  = j1, m3 ∈ U¨ t+1. Further, m3 ∈ U 
¨ t+1 and either














3  = m3: Since m3 ∈ U 
¨ t+1, m 
3 ∈ U 
¨ t+1 and
m 














j1  = m1,w eh a v em 












3. Since m3 ∈ U 
¨ t+1,ˆ m3 ∈ U 
¨ t+1
and ˆ m3   m3. Since m 






2,a n dˆ m3 ∈ U 
¨ t+1,w e
have m 
3 ∈ U 
¨ t+1 and m 
3   ˆ m3.T h u s , m 







¨ t+1(m2)  = h¨ t+1(m2):L e t a ≡ h¨ t+1(m2). By the induction hy-
pothesis, since h 




m3 ∈ U¨ t+1 ⊆ U 
¨ t+1.
Since O¨ t+1 ⊆ O 
¨ t+1, there is ˆ m ∈ N 
¨ t+1 such that h 
¨ t+1(ˆ m)=a and by
the induction hypothesis,ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 ) .










¨ t+1,a n dˆ m ∈ S 
¨ t+1.
Since h¨ t+1(ˆ m)  = a and since there is a ﬁrst ˆ t such that ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,ˆ t),
hˆ t(ˆ m)=h 
ˆ t(ˆ m)=a,a n dˆ m ∈ S 
ˆ t ⊆ Sˆ t.









:L e ta ≡ h¨ t+1(m1). Since h 
¨ t+1(m1)  = a, m1 ∈ S¨ t+1. Since O¨ t+1 ⊆ O 
¨ t+1,
there is ˆ m ∈ N 
¨ t+1 such that h 




j1,w eh a v e
that ˆ m ∈ S 





¨ t+1. Since h¨ t+1(ˆ m)  = a,b yt h einduction
hypothesis,ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 )a n dt h e r ei saﬁ r s tˆ t such that
ˆ m ∈ CONN(i,R ,ˆ t). Since ˆ m ∈ S 
¨ t+1 and p 
¨ t+1(ˆ m)=p 
ˆ t(ˆ m), we have
that ˆ m ∈ S 









Sˆ t. And for each ˆ ˆ t>ˆ t,w eh a v eˆ m
R −→
ˆ ˆ t
Sˆ ˆ t. Now consider







Sˇ t−1. However, if m2 ∈ U¨ t+1 ⊆ Uˇ t,t h e nm1
R −→
¨ t+1







In either case, we have reached a contradiction.
Stage ...) Repeating this argument for the rest of the pointing phase we show (iii).
Finally, we prove (iv) for Step ¨ t + 1. That is, we show that for each j ∈ N 
¨ t+1 \
CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 ) ,h¨ t+1(j)=h 
¨ t+1(j). By (iii) each trading cycle that does not
involve people connected to i under R  is also a trading cycle under R. Therefore,
for each j ∈ N 
¨ t+1 \ CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 ) ,h¨ t+1(j)=h 
¨ t+1(j). Moreover, for each
j ∈ CONN(i,R ,¨ t +1 ) ,h 
¨ t+2(j)=h 
¨ t+1(j).  
D Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Proposition 1: If N>2, no rule is strategy-proof, Pareto-eﬃcient and anony-
mous.
Proof: Let ϕ by a rule satisfying the axioms. We prove this for the case of N =3 .
Suppose ϕ is a strategy-proof and Pareto-eﬃcient.L e t O = {a,b,c}, N =
{1,2,3}, and let ω =( a,b,c). Consider the following preference proﬁle:
R1 R2 R3
abc a a  
bc bc
By eﬃciency, ϕ(R,ω)(1)  = a. Thus, either ϕ(R,ω)(2) = a or ϕ(R,ω)(3) = a.
Suppose ϕ(R,ω)(3) = a.
Claim (Limited favoritism): If 1 is indiﬀerent between all three objects, and
if 3’s unique most preferred object is a, it is assigned to him. That is, for each
R  ∈R N,24
R 





 ,ω)(3) = a.
24I0 is indiﬀerence between all objects.
48Proof: By strategy-proofness,f o re a c hR 
3 ∈R\{ R3} such that τ(R 
3,O)={a},
ϕ(R 
3,R −3,ω)(3) = a. Otherwise,








3     
truth
,R −3,ω)(3).
Also by strategy-proofness, there is no R 
2 ∈R , such that ϕ(R 




2     
lie
,R −2,ω)(2) P2     
truth
ϕ( R2     
truth
,R −2,ω)(2).
Thus, for any R  ∈R N such that R 
1 = I0 and τ(R 
3,O)={a}, ϕ(R ,ω)(3) = a. 
Since ϕ exhibits limited favoritism, it cannot be anonymous. 
Proposition 2: If N>2, no rule is strategy-proof, Pareto-eﬃcient, individually
rational, and non-bossy.
Proof: Suppose ϕ is strategy-proof, Pareto-eﬃcient, individually rational, and
non-bossy. We begin by noting that it satisﬁes limited favoritism as in the proof
of the previous proposition.
Claim (General favoritism): If a is not assigned to 1, then 3 ﬁnds his assign-
ment to be at least as good as a. That is, for each R ∈R N,
ϕ(R,ω)(1)  = a ⇒ ϕ(R,ω)(3) R3 a.
Proof: Suppose not. Then, there is R ∈R N such that ϕ(R,ω)(1)  = a and
aP 3 ϕ(R,ω)(3). Let α ≡ ϕ(R,ω). Since α(1)  = a and α(3)  = a,w eh a v e
α(2) = a.
Case bP 3 a: Since α(1)  = a,b yindividual rationality, there is x ∈{ b,c} such that xR 1 a.
Since bP 3 a, α(3)  = b. Thus, by Pareto-eﬃciency, α(1) = b. Further, by
Pareto-eﬃciency, bP 1 c and by individual rationality, bR 1 a. There are four
possible conﬁgurations for the preference proﬁle:
R1 R2 R3
b   a   b
. . .




b   a   bb




b   a a   b
c








49The circled allocation in each of the above is α.B ystrategy-proofness,i fα
is chosen at any one of the four conﬁgurations, it is chosen at the ﬁrst. Thus,
it is suﬃces to show that α cannot be chosen for the ﬁrst conﬁguration.
Consider the following preference proﬁle:
R 
1 R2 R3
b   a   b
ac
. . . a
c  
By strategy-proofness, b is assigned to 1. By non-bossiness, a is assigned
to 2 and c is assigned to 3.
Now, consider another preference proﬁle:
R 
1 R2 R 
3
b   a   a
ac
. . . b c  
At (R 
1,R 2,R  
3), by strategy-proofness, c is assigned to 3 and by Pareto-
eﬃciency, b is assigned to 1 and a is assigned to 2. By strategy-proofness





b   a   a
ac c b c  
b
Now suppose 1 reports I0,
¯ R1 R 
2 R 
3
a b   ca a  
c   bc
b
At ( ¯ R1,R  
2,R  
3), by limited favoritism, a is assigned to 3 and by Pareto-
eﬃciency c is assigned to 2, leaving b for 1. But by strategy-proofness, b is
assigned to 1 at (R 
1,R  
2,R  
3). By non-bossiness, the circled allocation cannot
be chosen.
50Case aP 3 b: This case is similar.  
Now, we show that general favoritism is incompatible with individual rationality
and Pareto-eﬃciency. Consider the following proﬁle.




By Pareto-eﬃciency and individual rationality, b is assigned to 1 and a is assigned
to 2. This violates general favoritism.
51E List of abbreviations
Abbrev. Description
O Set of distinct objects.
N Set of people.
ω : N → O List of endowments.
ω(i) i’s component of the endowment.
Ri i’s weak preference relation over O.
R Set of all preference relations over O.
R A preference proﬁle.
RN Set of all preference proﬁles.
P Set of strict preference relations.
R−i Preference relation of everyone but i.
RS Preference proﬁle of people in S ⊆ N.
R−S Preference proﬁle of people not in S ⊆ N.
A Set of allocations.
α(i) i’s component of α ∈ A.
α(S)=
 
i∈S{α(i)} Collective assignment to members of S ∈ N under α.
ϕ : RN × A → A A rule that selects an allocation for each problem.
Ot ⊆ O Remaining objects determined after the departure phase
in Step t of the top cycles algorithm.
Nt ⊆ N Remaining preople determined after the departure phase
in Step t of the top cycles algorithm.
ht+1 : Nt → Ot Holding vector determined after the trading phase in Step t
of the top cycles algorithm.
pt(i) Person whom i points at.
i −→
t j i points at j in Step t of the top cycles algorithm.
i −→
t −→
t j i points at someone who is pointing at j in Step t of the
top cycles algorithm.
i −→
t M, M ⊂ Nt i points at someone in M ∈ Nt in Step t of the top cycles
algorithm.
St Set of satisﬁed people who hold one of their most preferred
objects among Ot
Ut = Nt \ St Set of unsatisﬁed people.
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